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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The efficiency of the common law generated discussion among legal 
economists quite early in the law and economics literature.  The 
controversial thesis was introduced by Judge Richard Posner in his seminal 
book, Economic Analysis of Law.1  His main argument was that there is an 
implicit economic logic to the common law.2  In his view, the doctrines in 
common law provide a coherent and consistent system of incentives which 
induce efficient behavior, not merely in explicit markets, but in all social 
contexts (the so-called implicit markets).3  For example, common law 
reduces transaction costs to favor market transactions when appropriate.4  
Quite naturally, Judge Posner recognizes that not all doctrines in common 
law are economically justifiable or even easy to understand from an 
economic perspective.5  Economics does not offer a complete and exhaustive 
theory of the common law, but his view is that it offers a balanced and 
significant explanation.6 
Judge Posner’s hypothesis can be traced back to the evolutionary theory 
of the common law suggested by Justice Holmes in the 1880s.7  Holmes’s 
main argument was that the judicial responses to public policy, rather than 
some internal logic, drive development of the common law.8  According to 
him, the ability of the common law to adjust appropriately to external needs 
relied on the recruitment of the judiciary as representatives of the 
community.9  Notably, Holmes’s theory vehemently opposed the codification 
movement in the United States in those days.10  Justice Holmes did not use 
an efficiency argument for the common law (and against codification).11  
Although developed in a different historical background, Judge Posner’s 
understanding of the common law is not very different from the theory 
developed by Justice Holmes. 
It is important to stress that the common law of Justice Holmes and Judge 
Posner reflects the Blackstonian definition.  According to Sir William 
                                                                                                                                                       
 1 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011).  
 2 Id. at 315. 
 3 Id. at 315–20. 
 4 Id. at 315; see Anthony Niblett et al., The Evolution of a Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325 (2010) (discussing application of empirical testing of common law in commercial areas 
converging to efficiency). 
 5 POSNER, supra note 1, at 320. 
 6 Id. 
 7 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1891). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Sheldon M. Novick, Introduction, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 
(1991). 
 11 Id. 
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Blackstone, writing in 1796, the common law consists of general customs by 
which the judges and the courts are guided and directed.12  Alternatively, the 
common law includes all legal doctrines that do not require a written form to 
be valid but rather rely on the usage by courts.13  Therefore, statutes have a 
secondary and subordinate role.14  They are essentially declaratory (to restate 
the common law) or remedial (to correct the flaws of the common law).15 
However, in American legal history, the Blackstonian understanding of 
the common law has not been without controversies.  For example, Justice 
Cardozo saw clear advantages in the codification process and recognized 
some advantages to the French legal method in shaping judgments.16  “The 
American codification debate in the nineteenth century clearly shows that 
there are multiple understandings of the role of the common law.”17  By 
proposing the efficiency hypothesis of the common law, Judge Posner 
noticeably opts for one side of the discussion.  Unfortunately, most legal 
economists have not realized that the Posnerian hypothesis has to be 
understood in the context of a richer debate.18  Looking at the debates in the 
past, the traditional arguments for the Blackstonian common law included 
flexibility, stability, and ability to develop better rules without the need for 
statutes.19  The conventional arguments against the Blackstonian common 
law mentioned uncertainty (because of conflicting precedents), difficulty of 
nonlawyers to understand the law (higher transaction costs in modern 
economic language), and incorrectly allowing judges to legislate.20  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
 12 THE COMMENTARIES OF SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNIGHT, ON THE LAWS AND 
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 1 (A.B.A., 2009). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 8. 
 15 Id. 
 16 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 143 (9th ed. 1937) (“No 
doubt the ideal system . . . would be a code at once so flexible and so minute, as to supply in 
advance for every conceivable situation the just and fitting rule.”). 
 17 Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the 
Common Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287, 293–94 (2011). 
 18 See David S. Clark, Development of Comparative Law in the United States, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 175, 175–215 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006), for a more detailed discussion about the influence of civil law in the 
United States.  See generally Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 355 (1999) (noting the debate surrounding codification of American law in the 
nineteenth century). 
 19 See Morriss, supra note 18, at 376–77 (explaining that “code opponents argued that the 
common law was elastic and flexible and so could adapt itself to new circumstances” and 
“[i]ndeed, code opponents also claimed that the common law was simultaneously more stable 
as well as more elastic than statutes”). 
 20 Id. at 369. 
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Still,  
Judge Posner’s hypothesis of the efficiency of the common law 
begs for a more detailed explanation from the start.  In particular, 
the hypothesis lacks a more explicit [and consistent] mechanism 
for explaining why the common law should be efficient. . . . [A] 
remarkable literature emerged as a consequence.  Legal 
economists proposed different [and ingenious] explanations that 
have been evolutionary models identifying the forces that have 
shaped the common law to generate efficient rules.21  
“[I]f the common law is evolutionarily efficient, we are left with no 
explanation for the important doctrinal differences across common law 
jurisdictions . . . .”22  One of the many problems with the economic literature 
on this topic is the confusing use of “common law” to describe different legal 
features.  Our definition is the standard one: “a body of general rules 
prescribing social conduct,” originally enforced by the ordinary royal courts 
in England (as opposed to equity, local, or ecclesiastical courts), and 
characterized by the development of its own principles in actual legal 
controversies (through the use of judicial precedents), by the procedure of 
trial by jury, and by the doctrine of the supremacy of law (all agencies of 
government are subject to court review and compelled to follow legal 
procedure such as due process).23 
A.  Development of the Common Law 
The development of the common law in the thirteen colonies followed 
different paths that were not only distinct from the original English common 
law, but also between the colonies themselves.24  Unlike in the English 
tradition, colonial law tended to be codified with the exception of 
Maryland.25  Some of these colonial law codes departed significantly from 
the English common law, in particular in New England (Massachusetts most 
importantly) and Pennsylvania.26  In other cases, such as Virginia and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 21 Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 294 (internal citations omitted).  See generally Paul 
H. Rubin, Micro and Macro Legal Efficiency: Supply and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 19, 
21–27 (2005) (providing an example of the evolutionary models as applied to common law).  
Explanations are discussed in detail in the following pages of this Article.  See infra notes 77–79. 
 22 Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 296.  
 23 ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 178–79 (1966). 
 24 PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 9 
(1899).  
 25 Id. at 53. 
 26 Nevertheless, there were standard provisions to ensure that colonial law would not be 
radically in conflict with English common law.  Id. 
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Carolinas, English law was influential in adjudication, for example, but 
subsidiary to colonial law.27  In a show of the general respect for self rule, 
appeals from colonial courts to the English Privy Council were generally not 
allowed and drastically discouraged.28  Thus, it was not English common 
law, but these local departures that shaped the general reasoning and 
principles of American common law.29 
All the same, it is unquestionable that the English common law 
influenced and formed the American common law.30  No doubt there were 
political and economic factors helping the convergence with English law.31  
But the very different realities faced by the colonies and the metropolis led to 
significant departures from the English common law in many fields of law, 
notably property (including inheritance, alienability, and trespass), contracts 
(including remedies and restitution), torts (from negligence rules to 
proximate causation), slavery laws, and family (marriage and divorce 
rules).32  
In fact, we could describe the early stages of American common law 
more accurately by recognizing the existence of thirteen different legal 
systems with different degrees of codification (quite significant in 
Massachusetts due to the Puritan distrust of lawyers).33  English law was 
important more in the sense of providing a background and legal method 
than the elements of substantive law.34  The situation changed in the 
eighteenth century, when colonial courts became more English in nature.35  
The British developed more interventionist methods of governing the 
colonies, which resulted in a strengthening of the executive power.36  
Although the British did not opt for a model of giving the courts in London 
jurisdiction over colonial courts, the role of the Privy Council was 
enhanced.37  Colonial statute law was subject to review by the Privy 
                                                                                                                                                       
 27 Id. at 54. 
 28 But see MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION (2004) (describing 
Rhode Island’s struggle to prevent the private appeal to the Privy Council). 
 29 REINSCH, supra note 24 (noting that the circumstances of the colonies influenced them to 
depart from English common law); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 
(2005). 
 30 JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 874 (2009). 
 31 Id. at 878. 
 32 See id. at 873–921 (cataloging the differences between the English and American 
common law by subject). 
 33 FRIEDMAN, supra note 29.  Many colonial statutes have not been studied by modern legal 
historians because they have disappeared.  See, for example, the recent discovery of the Laws 
and Liberties of Massachusetts from 1648. 
 34 Id.  
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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Council.38  A process of convergence in substance and style was imposed by 
the Privy Council.39  Yet frequent delays and the permissive attitude of the 
Council (more political than truly judicial) undermined the possibility of full 
conformity of the colonial courts by the time of independence.40 
Similar trends are found in other common law jurisdictions, such as 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland.41  Their common law systems 
have been formed and shaped by the English common law.  Yet local 
determinants and different historical events have effected important 
departures from the original law in significant areas.42 
B.  Local Determinants of the Common Law and Legal Origins 
This Article assesses the efficiency of the common law hypothesis to 
detect the possible explanations for those main differences.  If local 
determinants shape the common law differently, the literature needs to 
address these particularities that have been largely ignored.  The 
consequence is that there might be no single efficient outcome, thus 
undermining the “one-size-fits-all” theory of the legal origins literature.43  
Alternatively, it could be the case that the common law only converges to 
efficiency under some conditions that could be undermined by specific local 
determinants. 
In a different paper, we have already criticized the one-size-fits-all theory 
proposed by the legal origins literature.44  In that paper, we have provided a 
methodological critique of recent work by legal economists that emphasizes 
the superiority of the common law system over French civil law.  We argued 
there that such an approach was based on a selected “cherry-picking” of legal 
doctrines and macro-generalizations that lack a serious theoretical 
framework.45  In that article, we articulated our skepticism concerning the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See HOGUE, supra note 23, at 235 (explaining that the common law is the root of the 
legal systems in all past British colonies). 
 42 See MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 114–21 (2d ed. 
1716) (detailing the specific divergence of the Irish common law from that of the English). 
 43 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 504–05 (2001) (positing that the common law creates quicker growth 
because of stronger property and contract rights.  The most critical claim is against French law 
since other civil law systems—German and Scandinavian—perform at least as well as 
common law); see also Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 
46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 326–27 (2008) (explaining the theory of legal origins).  See 
generally Gani Aldashev, Legal Institutions, Political Economy, and Development, 25 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 257 (2009) (surveying different legal origins research). 
 44 Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 288. 
 45 Id.  
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possibility of a sophisticated theory to sustain the superiority of the common 
law legal family.46 
This Article reinforces our skepticism.  It seems clear that the common 
law adjusts to local determinants that vary across the world, therefore 
producing different doctrines and legal outcomes.  This argument contributes 
by further casting doubt on the selected cherry-picking methodology of the 
legal origins literature and the corresponding macro-generalizations.  If the 
common law of a certain field, such as property or contracts, produces 
significantly different doctrines depending on local determinants, it is 
unclear which cherry-picked doctrine is being used to distinguish the 
common law from other legal families.  A light version of the one-size-fits-
all theory could suggest that not all rules across common law jurisdictions 
are actually efficient.  Rather, the legal origins literature proposes that the 
model for creating rules (but not the substantive laws) is the same across 
common jurisdictions and more efficient than alternative methods (even if 
the substantive rules may turn out to be very different looking).  The problem 
with this version is, as we show, the indeterminacy of the outcome.  The 
empirical analysis employed by the one-size-fits-all theory focuses on the 
rules and doctrines, not the mechanisms.    
In our work, we look primarily to the area of torts because the differences 
across common law jurisdictions have been widely perceived to be relevant 
to determine economic efficiency (even if it is unclear that tort law in 
particular actually increases the efficiency of the law).47  Quite importantly, 
we want to focus on asymmetric developments of the common law based on 
case law, rather than those imposed by statute law.  For example, there are 
significant differences in the way common law jurisdictions treat class or 
group litigation.  However, many of these differences are explained by 
statute law in the United States,48 Australia,49 England and Wales,50 and 
Canada,51 notwithstanding the significant influence of judge-made law.52  A 
                                                                                                                                                       
 46 Id. at 289. 
 47 See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Dispute and Its Resolution: Delineating the Economic Role of 
the Common Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 238 (2000) (arguing the efficiency of common law 
in contracts and property, but not in torts). 
 48 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 49 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IV(a) (Austl.).  This part came into force by 
the passage of the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act 1991 (Cth) s 3 (Austl.). 
 50 Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132, R. 19-19.15 (U.K.). 
 51 Class Proceedings Act, S.O. 1992, c. 6 (Can.); Class Proceedings Act 1996, R.S.B.C. 
1996, c. 50 (Can.); Class Actions Act, S.N.L. 2001, C-18.1 (Can.); Class Actions Act, S.S. 
2001, c. C-12.01 (Can.); Class Proceedings Act, S.M. 2002, c. 14 (Can.); Class Proceedings 
Act, S.A. 2003, c. C-16.5 (Can.). 
 52 The English case law concerning the application of civil procedure rules to group 
litigation was influential, among others, in Australian and Canadian statute law going back to 
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873.  The role of the English Court of Appeal in 
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similar remark can be made in the context of the common law presumption 
of individual rights, with Australia being the outstanding exception,53 while 
the United Kingdom,54 United States,55 Canada,56 and New Zealand57 have 
developed important statutory law. 
Property law is also a remarkable illustration in this context.58  Created by 
courts, property rights are always conveyed as a result of an exchange among 
people.  It is both important to determine who owns the right to control a 
certain resource or a specific good and to discover the ability of the owner to 
transmit or limit the use of the resource.  The problem is common to movable 
as well as real estate property.  In the latter case, given the costs and the use 
as collateral in modern economics, it is more relevant to identify the owner 
and to know the legal status of the property in order to protect purchasers.  It 
is easy to understand that, in every legal system, a great part of the rules 
governing real estate property is intended to promote a reliable way to 
convey and exchange property.  The main goal involves the protection of 
potential purchasers and their abilities to get loans.  As it is well-known, real 
estate security and stability play a role of the utmost importance in economic 
growth. 
The Torrens system of land registration was developed in the nineteenth 
century in Australia.59  It was later implemented in New Zealand, Western 
Canada, and other British possessions.60  However, in many areas of Britain 
(mainly Scotland and Ireland), Canada, and the United States, a traditional 
                                                                                                                                                       
developing appropriate procedures for multiparty litigation has been noticed by legal scholars.  
In this matter, see the discussion in RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON 
LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS (2004). 
 53 Australia has no Bill of Rights.  Individual rights have been expanded by the case law of 
the Australian High Court.  See generally James Allan, You Don’t Always Get What You Pay 
For: No Bill of Rights for Australia, 24 N.Z. U. L. REV. 179 (2010). 
 54 Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W & M., c. 2 (Eng.); Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); see 
David Erdos, Ideology, Power Orientation and Policy Drag: Explaining the Elite Politics of 
Britain’s Bill of Rights Debate, 44 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 20 (2009) (framing the Human 
Rights Act as part of a Bill of Rights agenda). 
 55 U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
 56 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.). 
 57 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; see David Erdos, Aversive Constitutionalism in the 
Westminster World: The Genesis of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990), 5 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 343 (2007) (demonstrating the aversive model of constitutionalization of rights in 
established democrasies); David Erdos, Judicial Culture and the Politicolegal Opportunity 
Structure: Explaining Bill of Rights Legal Impact in New Zealand, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95 
(2009) (arguing that New Zealand bill of rights case law has been largely confined to criminal 
or freedom of speech issues, a culture established from British judicial norms). 
 58 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2011). 
 59 THEODORE B.F. RUOFF, AN ENGLISHMAN LOOKS AT THE TORRENS SYSTEM 1–2 (1957). 
 60 John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer 
Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 95 (1992). 
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system of land recording has persisted.61  The main difference between these 
two title systems is that registration generates a provisional priority for 
claims, whereas recording does not.62  As a consequence, in the case of a 
valid claim by a third party, the current owner keeps the land under 
registration (the rightful claimant gets compensated by the public system of 
registration), whereas under recording the current owner loses the land (but 
usually receives compensation if an insurance mechanism is in place). 
Recording and registration have been shaped by judge-made law, but the 
Torrens system was not introduced by the courts.63  A similar analysis can be 
developed for adverse possession.  The traditional common law approach to 
adverse possession has been changed by important legislation in the United 
Kingdom,64 where significant differences are now observable.65 
C.  The Role of Statute Law 
One immediate explanation for observed differences across common law 
countries could be the asymmetric role of statute law.66  Even if statutory law 
prevails over judge-made law in all common law jurisdictions today, such 
                                                                                                                                                       
 61 Id. at 129 n.5. 
 62 Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
401, 420–21 (2003); Benito Arruñada & Nuno Garoupa, The Choice of Titling System in 
Land, 48 J.L. & ECON. 709, 711 (2005); Benito Arruñada, Property Titling and Conveyancing, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 237, 240–44 (Harry Smith & 
Ken Ayotte eds., 2010); Garoupa & Ligüerre, supra note 17, at 312–13 (“The alleged 
superiority of the registration system is not immune to criticism.  Registration helps property 
transactions, as well as the use of property as collateral, by reducing uncertainty.  However, it 
is a more expensive and demanding system because the cost of purging titles is not negligible.  
Consequently, it could be that a more expensive system, such as registration, expels an 
important fraction of property from the public system.  On the other hand, recording is a 
cheaper titling system, and therefore the fraction of property expelled from the public system 
is presumably lower.  Clearly, there is a trade-off between the assurance of quality of titling in 
land and the expulsion of property from the public system.  From a theoretical perspective, it 
is not clear which titling system is better for the enforcement of property rights.”). 
 63 RUOFF, supra note 59. 
 64 Land Registration Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 21 (Eng.); Land Registration Act, 2002, 
c. 9 (Eng.). 
 65 See Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1995) (discussing the underlying economic rationale of the 
adverse possession doctrine); Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and Adverse 
Possession Reform Act, a Proposal for Reform of the United States Real Property Law, 12 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2004) (analyzing the Land Registration Acts of 1925 and 2002 and other 
aspects of the U.K. registration system); Barbara Bogusz, Bringing Land Registration into the 
Twenty-First Century — The Land Registration Act 2002, 65 MOD. L. REV. 556 (2002) 
(analyzing the effects of the Land Registration Act of 2002); Amnon Lehavi, The Property 
Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987 (2008) (analyzing the effects of the Land Registration Act of 2002). 
 66 See Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Diversity in Shareholder Protection in Common 
Law Countries, J. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS, Spring 2007, at 3 (discussing differences in 
shareholder protection law among common law countries). 
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preponderance varies.  In that case, the potential inefficiencies could be 
possibly unrelated to the common law itself; in particular, if we take the view 
suggested by legal economists that statute law is intrinsically less efficient 
than judge-made law.67  In fact, one of the main arguments for the superiority 
of judge-made law is that private interests are more likely to capture the 
legislature than the courts, although we think that such argument is debatable 
at the theoretical as well as at the empirical level.68  From our perspective 
there is no systematic evidence that rent-seeking is more persistent with the 
legislature than with the courts, since demand and supply conditions are 
fundamentally different.69  Moreover, courts and legislators have their own 
goals in terms of enhancing their influence, which complicates the potential 
effect of private interests in lawmaking.70  However, we recognize that using 
statute law as the main source to explain differences across common law 
jurisdictions would be self-defeating in the eyes of those who believe in the 
efficiency hypothesis of the common law.  
Our approach in this Article does not mean we reject the view held by 
other legal scholars that the interaction of judge-made law and statute law 
might actually improve rather than hurt convergence for efficiency.  Most 
likely an appropriate mix of judicial precedent and statute rule should be the 
efficient outcome.71  Otherwise, given the growth of statute law in all 
                                                                                                                                                       
 67 See Andreas Engert & D. Gordon Smith, Unpacking Adaptability, 2009 BYU L. REV. 
1553, 1562 (stating that “increasing the adaptability of the law—and hence making the law 
less predictable—is not a general policy advice to enhance overall efficiency”). 
 68 See Michael A. Crew & Charlotte Twight, On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice 
Perspective, 66 PUB. CHOICE 15 (1990) (arguing that common law is less subject to rent-
seeking than statute law); see also Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 205 (1982) (arguing that both common law and statute law are influenced by private 
interests to advance their goals).  The most devastating criticism is GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW (1997) and Gordon Tullock, Rent-Seeking and the Law, in 5 
THE SELECTED WORKS OF GORDON TULLOCK 184 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 2005).  See also 
Todd J. Zywicki, Spontaneous Order and the Common Law: Gordon Tullock’s Critique, 135 
PUB. CHOICE 35 (2008) (examining comparative attributes of the common and civil law 
systems). 
 69 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest 
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); W. Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, 
Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1979); W. 
Mark Crain & Robert D. Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theory of 
Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979); Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent 
Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) (discussing 
several theories of capture in rulemaking); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory 
Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (1997); Howard S. 
Erlanger & Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 959 (1997). 
 70 A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of 
Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 447–48 (1999). 
 71 For a technical model, see Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law 
Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2008) (predicting 
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common law jurisdictions, the obvious conclusion should be that the overall 
efficiency has been reduced considerably in recent times.72  The argument 
that the efficiency of the common law is not really demand-side induced (i.e., 
through the incentives provided by litigation) but supply-side induced 
reinforces this drastic conclusion.  According to this version, the historical 
competition between common law and equity courts was the driving force; 
once these courts were merged and a monopoly had been achieved, the 
efficiency forces had lost stimulus.73 
Still, for the purpose of clarifying our arguments, both in the theoretical 
discussion as well as in the examples we consider, we have intentionally 
excluded the role of statute law as far as we can.  In other words, we focus 
primarily on doctrinal and rule diversity fostered by judge-made law. 
D.  Choice of Common Law Jurisdictions 
Our discussion focuses on “pure” common law jurisdictions such as the 
United States (neglecting Louisiana for the purpose of the paper), Canada 
(excluding Quebec in our analysis), England and Wales, Ireland, Australia or 
New Zealand.  The reason is to make sure the observed relevant differences 
are not induced by other elements of the legal system that prevail in “mixed” 
jurisdictions such as Israel or South Africa (by no means do we underplay 
the potential influence of Quebecois civil law in Canadian common law).74  
                                                                                                                                                       
the progressive convergence of common and civil law toward a mixed system); Carmine 
Guerriero, Democracy, Judicial Attitudes, and Heterogeneity: The Civil Versus Common Law 
Tradition (Univ. Cambridge, Working Paper No. 917, 2008) (arguing that case law 
outperforms statute law when political institutions are weak).  
 72 See Rubin, supra note 21, at 23 (noting that the common law might have been more 
efficient in the past when the organization of interests was more costly, but not now).  Also, 
these arguments face a serious challenge in areas such as antitrust law that might be statute 
law precisely because the traditional principle of fair trade in common law did not protect 
market competition and courts were excessively deferential to monopolies.  THE CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995). 
 73 See generally Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A 
Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003) (arguing for supply-side explanations 
based on competition between several court systems, in particular common law and equity).  
A more comprehensive discussion is provided by Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition 
and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007), who argues that 
institutional structures that were able to produce more innovative legal rules tended to prevail 
in English law.  However, he challenges the efficiency of the supply-side competition between 
these courts.  He notes that there was a pro-plaintiff bias that generated certain (hardly 
efficient) rules given the way judges were paid.  Important changes to judicial compensation 
and salaries corrected the pro-plaintiff bias in the nineteenth century. 
 74 See, e.g., Esin Örücü, General Introduction: Mixed Legal Systems at New Frontiers, in 
MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS (Esin Örücü ed., 2010); Vernon Valentine Palmer, 
Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems, in MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS AT NEW FRONTIERS, 
supra. 
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At the same time, we prefer to frame our discussion in the context of those 
jurisdictions rather than the American states (as well as the Canadian 
provinces or the Australian states) because it seems more appropriate when 
having in mind the current mathematical models of the evolution of the 
common law.  Clearly there are important variations in common law within 
the American states.  At the same time, given that they belong to a political 
union and are subject to identical federal law as well as the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, there is an inevitable contamination effect that shapes 
convergence.  It seems to us that jurisdictions that are not part of the same 
political and institutional unit provide for a better testing of our predictions.  
The following Part discusses the origins of the efficiency hypothesis of 
the common law and the relevant variables to explain differences across 
common law jurisdictions fostered by case law.  In Part III, we discuss 
examples of legal doctrines and rules that seem to be addressed differently 
across the common law world.  Part IV concludes the paper.  
II.  THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMON LAW HYPOTHESIS 
If the common law is to be efficient, certainly there must be strong 
reasons to support such an assertion.  One immediate explanation for the 
Posnerian hypothesis is that judges have a preference for efficiency.75  If 
judges pursue efficiency as the goal of law, it is no surprise that the common 
law is efficient.  However, this does not seem to be a persuasive argument.  
Why would judges care about efficiency rather than equality or other 
possible goals?  Moreover, from an empirical perspective, we now have an 
extensive literature showing that ideology and other significant 
nonefficiency-oriented variables play a major role in explaining judicial 
behavior.76  From a comparative perspective, the argument is also 
unpersuasive since there seems to be no strong reason for why American 
judges would care more or less about efficiency than Canadian or Australian 
judges. 
A second possible explanation is that efficiency is promoted by the 
prevalence of precedent (more efficient rules are more likely to survive 
through a mechanism of precedent).77  Another explanation relies on the 
incentives to bring cases and the role of court litigation (since inefficient 
rules are not welfare-maximizing).78  Nevertheless, these two explanations 
                                                                                                                                                       
 75 Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 
(1979). 
 76 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) 
(arguing political ideology of members of the judiciary help explain judicial behavior). 
 77 Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977). 
 78 George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977). 
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require a particular mix of case litigation in order to derive an efficient 
outcome.  In particular, variations concerning the prevalence of precedent 
(that traditionally was stronger in England than in America) and the mix of 
case litigation could explain differences across the common law world.  
However, it is unclear if such variations or differences indicate that the 
common law only achieves efficiency under some specific conditions. 
In fact, the search for a more convincing setup for the efficiency of the 
common law hypothesis has sparked important academic work.  This 
literature essentially looks at how litigation improves the law, or some 
specific legal doctrine, taking into consideration that only a self-selected 
number of cases is actually litigated.79 
The efficiency of the common law must be unequivocally related to the 
observation that litigation follows private interests.80  Presumably it is true 
that bad rules are challenged more often than good rules, so naturally court 
intervention could improve the overall quality of the law.  However, this line 
of reasoning is not without problematic shortcomings.  It could be that the 
subset of cases that are actually litigated are not representative enough to 
trigger the necessary improvements, hence biasing evolution of legal rules 
against efficiency.81  Furthermore, the emergence of efficiency in common 
law necessarily depends on a number of factors in the evolutionary 
mechanism, namely initial conditions, path dependence, and random 
shocks.82  
                                                                                                                                                       
 79 See John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 393, 394 (1978) (arguing that the probability that a particular litigant will win a 
favorable decision); Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law 
without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 156 (1980) (arguing “the law can improve 
by an unguided evolutionary process”); R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of 
Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981); PAUL H. RUBIN, BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE 
COMMON LAW (1983); Georg von Wagenheim, The Evolution of Judge-Made Law, 13 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1993); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of 
Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); Vincy Fon et al., 
Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 43 (2005); 
Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic 
Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006); FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE 
ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING (2009); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC 
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 464 (2009); Niblett et al., supra note 4, at 325 
(showing empirically that rules fail to converge with significant inconsistencies across states); 
Anthony Niblett, Do Judges Cherry Pick Precedents to Justify Extra-Legal Decisions?: A 
Statistical Examination, 70 MD. L. REV. 234 (2010).  A critical view of this literature is 
provided by FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 103–23 (2009). 
 80 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235 (1979) (making the point that judicial opinions are a public good that arbitration 
fails to provide). 
 81 Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 612–14 
(1992). 
 82 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 
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More recent work has provided a more comprehensive analytical 
framework to show under which precise mathematical conditions the 
evolution of the common law tends toward efficiency.83  For example, even 
if judges are ultimately efficiency-seeking, precedent and overruling must be 
balanced in an appropriate way.  A judicial bias might distort the law in the 
short run but at the same time provide the mechanism to improve the law in 
the long run, depending on critical elements of the evolution of the common 
law.84  The possibility of selective litigation driven by private interests (likely 
to be misaligned with social interests) just makes the whole process more 
complex; convergence to efficiency is still possible as long as the biases are 
not overwhelming to the point of hurting the likelihood that inefficient laws 
will be more often litigated.  Naturally strong precedent could be socially 
valuable if judges are significantly biased.85 
If the Posnerian hypothesis is true, at least in the long run, rules that do 
not promote efficient results should be repealed in any common law 
jurisdiction.86  Therefore, the central question is why common law 
jurisdictions have different doctrines in property, contracts, and torts.  When 
common law jurisdictions have a different doctrine in a particular relevant 
area of the law there could be two possible interpretations.  The first 
interpretation is that the evolution of the common law to efficiency generates 
multiple equilibria.  Therefore, each common law jurisdiction is potentially 
efficient and there are multiple efficient doctrines depending on local 
determinants.  The second interpretation is that there is one and only one 
                                                                                                                                                       
(1996).  For an explanation of path dependence theory, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path 
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 
86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606 (2001) (outlining what she considers to be three strands of path 
dependency). 
 83 See, e.g., Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. 
POL. ECON. 43, 46 n.4 (2007) (discussing following precedent, distinguishing and overruling 
as leading or not leading to efficiency). 
 84 See id.; Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the Instability of Law, 35 J. 
COMP. ECON. 309, 323 (2007) (noting that although inefficient laws are more easily litigated and 
replaced, which improves efficiency over time, this effect can still reduce the long run volatility 
of the law because it cannot ensure convergence to efficiency); Anthony Niblett, Case-By-Case 
Adjudication and the Path of the Car 184 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
http://works.bepress.com/Anthony_niblett/1/) (arguing that polarization concerning precedent 
depends on judicial preferences, cases that get litigated, and cost of adhering to precedent). 
 85 See Thomas J. Miceli, Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent, 
38 J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 165 (2009) (stating that “binding precedent plays no role in enhancing 
the efficiency of the law, but it can play a potentially important role in limiting the ability of 
biased judges to drive the law in an inefficient direction”); Luca Anderlini et al., Why Stare 
Decisis? (Working Paper, 2010) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616708) (arguing that 
stare decisis guarantees ex ante efficient decisions). 
 86 See Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 83, at 45 (referring to the Priest and Rubin theories 
“that disputes involving inefficient legal rules are more likely to be taken to court” and thus 
replaced “by better ones over time”).  
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efficient equilibrium, and many common law jurisdictions simply fail to 
achieve it.  We use the analytical models developed in the law and 
economics literature to identify the two possibilities and understand the 
implications.87  Quite the contrary, these possibilities are not mutually 
exclusive.  Hence, we conclude this Part by addressing the more realistic 
model which allows for the coexistence of both interpretations.   
A.  Multiple Efficient Equilibria 
When the fundamentals of the model vary across jurisdictions, we could 
have multiple efficient equilibria.  Each jurisdiction converges to an efficient 
doctrine and rule in the long run, but they are not the same because there are 
local conditions and aspects that vary significantly.88 
The process of convergence to an efficient and stable equilibrium is based 
on selective litigation.  The selective litigation could be different across the 
common law world in response to local conditions and asymmetric shocks 
caused by local historical events.  The circumstances under which an original 
rule or doctrine in common law is applied in different jurisdictions varies 
dramatically, since different sets of cases are litigated.  As a consequence, 
the conditional probability that a given inefficient rule is challenged is not 
the same.89  Therefore, the evolution of the common law follows different 
paths.  Of necessity, the pattern of path dependence will be consistently 
diverse leading to distinctive, but equally efficient, equilibria.90 
Legal historians seem to perceive this effect in explaining the 
development of the English common law and the early American common 
law.  Colonial law responded mainly to local problems and conditions faced 
by the European settlers, which were radically distinct from the realities of 
the English (and possibly the Irish) society.91  However, relying on these 
differences that resulted in dissimilar selective litigation to explain 
significant variations across the American colonies, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand seems less persuasive.   
                                                                                                                                                       
 87 In particular, we focus on Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 83; Miceli, supra note 85; 
Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 71; and Wagenheim, supra note 79. 
 88 Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 84, at 323–47.  
 89 See Miceli, supra note 85 (arguing that the rate of creation of inefficient rules depend 
upon the strength of governing precedent); Wagenheim, supra note 79. 
 90 See Roe, supra note 82, at 647–48 n.11 (stating that in applying a path dependency 
model when there are multiple results, one outcome need not be better than the other because 
each could have been good enough, where the author uses a weak-path dependency to indicate 
multiple equilibria); Hathaway, supra note 82, at 634–35 (using the rule against perpetuities as 
an example of how the rule developed because of history and that its existence, while 
explainable, was not necessarily a unique equilibrium, indicating that given other 
circumstances an equally efficient alternative rule may have been possible). 
 91 FRIEDMAN, supra note 29. 
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If there are multiple efficient equilibria due to distinctive selective 
litigation, the implications for the efficiency hypothesis of the common law 
are twofold.  First, the one-size-fits-all approach taken by the legal origins 
literature is undermined.  There is no single or unique common law as 
assumed by that literature, but a multiplicity of common law systems.  The 
focus on a particular doctrine or rule is not very informative concerning the 
efficiency of legal arrangements, since the appropriate response varies across 
the common law jurisdictions.  Second, under the efficiency hypothesis of 
the common law, when a particular jurisdiction adopts the common law 
approach as suggested by the legal origins literature, the “efficient” outcome 
is difficult to predict since particular local determinants might generate yet 
another completely new path.92    
Multiple efficient equilibria signal that the world is more complex than 
the approach taken by the legal origins literature.  A mistaken focus on legal 
outcomes hides the interaction of different local determinants with dissimilar 
path dependencies.  Under the current analytical models, the assessment of 
legal outcomes concerning efficiency cannot be disentangled from the 
varying selective litigation in each jurisdiction; certainly that has not been 
the approach taken by the legal origins literature.  
B.  Single Efficient Equilibrium 
Another possibility is that there is a single efficient equilibrium.  
Immediately we recognize that some common law jurisdictions seem to 
develop the efficient doctrine or rule, whereas others do not.  There are 
several possible explanations for why some common law jurisdictions fail to 
achieve efficiency. 
One possible reason is that the distribution of relevant attributes of 
judicial preferences is not the same.93  For example, the proportion of pro-
plaintiff and pro-defendant judges varies, with the consequence that the 
number of pro-efficient rule judges is different, and in some cases 
insufficient to force convergence to efficiency.94  Alternatively, the biases 
                                                                                                                                                       
 92 See generally Hathaway, supra note 82, at 634–35 (in explaining how the rule of 
perpetuities exemplifies increasing path dependence, stating that despite being able to 
ascertain how the rule of perpetuities came into existence, the final outcome selecting that 
approach would have been difficult to predict in advance and that given another set of 
historical circumstances the rules governing inheritance could have developed differently). 
 93 See Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 84, at 316 (claiming that the optimal (efficient) 
legal rule should be unbiased and that unless all judges are unbiased (which they are not), 
judge made law cannot achieve this outcome).  
 94 See Miceli, supra note 85, at 163 (assuming that precedent continues to be nonbinding, 
judges will decide cases that come before theme based solely on these preferences, meaning 
pro-plaintiff judges will uphold pro-plaintiff cases and overrule pro-defendant cases and vice 
versa). 
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favoring certain types of rules vary across the population of judges.  In 
particular, more polarized judiciaries are less likely to achieve efficient 
doctrines and rules.95  Efficiency requires a more unbiased judiciary and 
therefore more judicial polarization leads to significant social welfare 
losses.96  At the same time, a varying degree of influence of special interest 
groups in judicial politics could contribute toward shaping behavior in 
different ways that preclude some particular institutional arrangements from 
converging to efficiency.97  Moreover, the concern about the future evolution 
of the law measured by a specific discount factor (for example, how forward 
looking judges are) plays an important role in explaining efficiency.  A 
judiciary too focused on the short run and less so on the long run is less 
likely to generate an efficient legal outcome.98 
There are good reasons to think that the distribution of relevant judicial 
attributes varies across common law jurisdictions, with the U.S. judiciary 
probably being distinct from other common law judiciary.99  From the 
perspective of the current available models, these differences could be a by-
product of specific appointment mechanisms (that can polarize the judiciary 
or empower the influence of special interest groups), judicial tenure 
(including mandatory retirement), promotion and retention policies, or 
recruitment strategies (a wider or narrower pool of potential candidates to the 
judiciary that breeds different degrees of heterogeneity in the bench).  The 
most interesting implication of these considerations is that most probably the 
U.S. is the jurisdiction with the least likely judiciary (within the common law 
jurisdictions) to promote efficient legal outcomes according to the 
mathematical models.  
Another reason for why some common law jurisdictions fail to converge 
to efficiency is the role of precedent.  If the cost of changing precedent is too 
low, judicial biases prevail and the legal outcome in the long run is unlikely 
to be efficient.100  To put it differently, the judicial gains from getting closer 
to an efficient outcome are insufficient when it is easy to change 
                                                                                                                                                       
 95 Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 84, at 311, 315.  
 96 Id. at 313. 
 97 See Ponzetto & Fernandez, supra note 71, at 398 (identifying that judges are subject to 
additional pressures like those from interest groups and as a result their decisions are more 
variable than legislation because they depend not only society-wide general and special 
interests but also the interests of the parties appearing before them in court). 
 98 Id. at 382 (claiming that in the long run the dynamic properties of judge-made law make 
it an average more efficient). 
 99 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN THE UK AND USA (1996) 
(comparing and contrasting the divergent evolution of the common law in the U.K. and U.S.). 
 100 See Miceli, supra note 85, at 165 (“[T]he law will converge on the efficient rule (or 
diverge from it) more quickly as . . . the cost of abandoning precedent[ ] becomes 
small . . . .”); Gennaioli & Shleifer, supra note 83, at 56 (arguing that if the initial legal 
precedent is precise, the subsequent legal rules become more, and not less, precise). 
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precedent.101  Consequently the value of precedent plays an important role.  
Frequent defections from an established precedent undermine the process of 
converging to efficiency.  In the context of the common law jurisdictions, 
there are important differences on how precedent is respected.  U.S. judges 
seem to be more willing to change precedent than the English judiciary as a 
general observation (with particular reference to horizontal precedent).102  
Again, if that is so, it seems likely that the American common law is less 
likely to achieve efficiency than the English common law. 
There are important implications from a model with a single efficient 
equilibrium.  The most immediate is that if doctrines and rules vary across 
the common law jurisdictions, only one is efficient and the remaining failed 
to achieve it.  Given that the initial condition was presumably the same 
(English law) we can conclude that some judicial intervention helps 
efficiency but, under different conditions, judicial intervention is detrimental.  
Another inference from this model is that the common law is efficient 
only under certain conditions.  Not all common law jurisdictions satisfy 
those conditions, both in terms of judicial attributes and cost of changing 
precedent.  A comparison across common law jurisdictions demands a focus 
on the local judiciary and the stickiness of precedent.  
The consequences for the legal origins literature are quite obvious.  A 
single efficient equilibrium supports the idea of a one-size-fits-all approach.  
However, the details are the conundrum in this context as what we have is 
the potential efficiency of a specific common law system.  At the same time, 
there are clear prescriptions to improve the performance of each common 
law institutional arrangement, in terms of reforming the judiciary and the 
preponderance of precedent.   
C.  Putting Both Models Together 
Combining the two possible models we have considered so far, we derive 
a more complex and realistic overview of the efficiency hypothesis of the 
common law.  First, there is not a single efficient rule or doctrine, but a 
multiplicity of possible equilibria depending on selective litigation.  Second, 
for each specific set of selective litigation, there is no guarantee that there 
will be convergence to efficiency, depending on judicial attributes and the 
preponderance of precedent.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 101 See Wagenheim, supra note 79. 
 102 POSNER, supra note 99; see also E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1043, 1045–46 (1975) (finding that the American judiciary congratulated itself from 
moving away from the strict English doctrine of precedent); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in 
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
647, 664 n.84 (1999) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court would have the power to 
overrule itself on the horizontal plane). 
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The most important consequence is that the identification of the 
efficiency of the common law is much more intricate and multifaceted than 
anticipated by the literature.  A mere comparison of how a specific 
predicament is addressed in each jurisdiction, as inspired by the legal origins 
literature, is not only insufficient but also likely to produce gross mistakes.  
The observation that each jurisdiction provides a different legal outcome 
says very little about efficiency due to the existence of multiple efficient 
solutions and because the variables that determine efficient outcomes vary.  
A proper analysis requires a clear understanding of local determinants, 
including judicial preferences, before we can jump to the conclusion that the 
common law is undoubtedly efficient. 
The next section introduces relevant examples to illustrate the difficulties 
of the exercise.  They show that once we depart from a general and 
undefined efficiency hypothesis of the common law into specific doctrines 
and rules, the analysis is complex, dense, and less clear than the legal origins 
literature portrays.  They also illustrate situations where multiple equilibria 
are more likely and where a single efficient equilibrium is probable. 
III.  DISCUSSION OF EXAMPLES 
We look at illustrative examples starting with tort law, generally 
speaking, then the particularities of defamation and professional 
responsibility, followed by cost rules in civil litigation (we argue this is a 
good candidate for multiple equilibria), and conclude with civil juries (the 
diversity in the use of civil juries seems to provide an excellent example of 
an inefficient equilibrium).  These examples are not exhaustive or suggested 
to be representative.  Our choice of tort and procedure is merely practical.  
The differences across common law jurisdictions on tort law and procedure 
are widely documented.  At the same time, they easily relate to theoretical 
and empirical literature in law and economics that is helpful in assessing the 
plausibility of multiple efficient equilibria in the context of our discussion.  
A.  Tort Law 
Tort law is one of the fields of law in which differences among common 
law jurisdictions are more acute and significant.  Even though they have an 
identical origin in the old English common law, general theories on recovery 
and judgments have evolved in a different way in each and every 
jurisdiction.  Clearly, all of them have in common the same foundational 
legal authorities.  For abnormally dangerous things or activities, all quote the 
doctrine stated in Rylands v. Fletcher,103 an English decision rendered by the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 103 Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.). 
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House of Lords in 1868.  The case established law according to which a 
person who carries out an activity that substantially increases the probability 
of causing harm to others assumes a stricter standard of liability.104  In the 
same vein, common law jurisdictions share the doctrine of Davies v. 
Mann.105  This is another important English case that established the last 
clear chance doctrine, the most commonly accepted modification of the 
contributory negligence rule.106  Likewise, it is needless to point out the great 
influence of the English admiralty law in the general evolution of the 
common law of torts. 
Although the old common law has influenced all jurisdictions, it has also 
grandfathered different and variable trends, especially regarding the 
compensation of personal injuries.107  While some jurisdictions still apply the 
general doctrines in a very similar way to their original conception, others 
have established new doctrines based on punitive damages or even damages 
calculated by caps.108 
More specifically, while Canada, Ireland, Australia, and—obviously—the 
United Kingdom have remained quite similar to the principles which inspired 
the function of tort law institutions in early English law; other jurisdictions, 
in particular New Zealand and the U.S., have experienced a deep 
transformation in the last decades.109 
In the vast sectors of the U.S. law culture, tort law has come under fire in 
the last couple of years.110  The biases of the civil juries in tort cases, and the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 104 For a general explanation on Rylands v. Fletcher, and other English cases related with the 
origins of the strict liability doctrine, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 545–48 (5th ed. 1984). 
 105 Davies v. Mann, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex.). 
 106 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 104, at 462–64 (laying out the affirmative defense of the 
last clear chance doctrine). 
 107 COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Sheila A.M. McLean 
ed., 1993) (giving general background on the law of damages); TORT AND INSURANCE LAW 
VOL. 4: COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Bernard A. 
Koch & Helmut Koziol eds., 2003) [hereinafter TORT AND INSURANCE LAW] (giving general 
background on the law of damages); see also Jeffrey O’Connell & David Partlett, An 
America’s Cup for Tort Reform? Australia and America Compared, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
443, 445–54 (1988) (detailing the different avenues of tort reform). 
 108 O’Connell & Partlett, supra note 107. 
 109 For a general explanation of the evolution of the system, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT 
LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2003).  For a survey of New Zealand tort law, 
see Rosemary Tobin & Elsabe Schoeman, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme: 
The Statutory Bar and the Conflict of Laws, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2005) (detailing the New 
Zealand accident compensation scheme). 
 110 See Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28, 47–50 
(2011) (noting that the studies of tort law reform have been flawed).  For a survey of judicial 
opinions on tort law and reform, see Larry Lyon et al., Straight from the Horse’s Mouth: 
Judicial Observations of Jury Behavior and the Need for Tort Reform, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 
419 (2007).  
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alleged excessive amounts established in the context of punitive damages, 
have promoted a general sense that a reform of the tort system is needed.111  
Some U.S. jurisdictions have been named as “judicial hellholes” by the 
American Tort Reform Association,112 a movement that reports on spurious 
litigation in tort and promotes legal change in order to contain the increase of 
damages. 
In New Zealand, almost all personal injury damages actions are now 
barred from reaching the courts.  Since 1974, damages are decided by a 
government agency, the Accident Compensation Corporation, which 
promotes no-fault benefits for victims of accidents.113  The tasks of the 
agency have been expanded to include more areas of the law in the last 
decades.  Its origins are linked to the damages due from labor accidents.  
Like in the vast majority of jurisdictions (both common law and civil law), 
damages are calculated on an objective basis previous to the claim being 
filed.  For example, New Zealand is establishing objective criteria for 
medical malpractice claims.114  Damages are calculated by caps that 
standardize compensations and bar the discussion on damages and 
compensation in the courts of law.115 
New Zealand has embraced a pure compensation system that completely 
replaced the common law remedies for tort, an approach pursued by other 
jurisdictions for workers’ compensation only.116  In fact, the Woodhouse 
Report, so called in honor of the president of the commission that launched 
the reform, began its discussion focused on the alternative ways to improve 
                                                                                                                                                       
 111 For example, see Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 
360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 18, 1994), the so-called “McDonald’s Coffee Case,” where the jury 
awarded $2.86 million to a woman who burned herself with a cup of coffee she purchased at a 
McDonald’s restaurant.  See Thomas S. Ulen, The View from Abroad: Tort Law and Liability 
Insurance in the United States, in TORT LAW AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 207–38 (Gerhard 
Wagner ed., 2005). 
 112 AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2011/2012 (2011), available at http://www.j 
udicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Judicial-Hellholes-2011.pdf.  The American Tort 
Reform Association was founded in 1986.  Since then it has focused on promoting the control—
even statutorily—of the damages award to plaintiffs in civil tort cases.  About ATRA, ATRA.ORG, 
http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
 113 A complete study on the initial consequences of the reform can be found in GEOFFREY 
PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY ON LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW 
ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979). 
 114 See generally Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187 
(2008) (describing New Zealand’s tort reform). 
 115 Some jurisdictions, including civil law countries, have followed the New Zealand example.  
Spain, for instance, has since 1995 implemented a statutory cap system for calculating damages 
for personal injuries caused by traffic accidents.  Jesús Pintos Ager, Damage Schedules & Tort 
Litigation in Spain 3–4 (InDret, Working Paper No. 131, 2003) (available at http://www.indret. 
com/pdf/131_en.pdf). 
 116 PALMER, supra note 113; Schuck, supra note 114, at 188; Tobin & Schoeman, supra note 
109, at 493. 
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workers’ and road accident victim’s compensation schemes.  At that point, 
the members of the commission realized that spreading the system for all 
personal injuries caused by accidents and criminal offenses would reduce 
administrative costs.117  The most profound reform of the common law of 
torts began as a political decision, but did not find antagonism among the 
judiciary, and it has been fairly consensual in New Zealand.118 
The abovementioned examples show how deep the differences are in tort 
law within the common law jurisdictions.119  As we have mentioned before, 
it is debatable that tort law evolves to efficiency.120  The different trends 
followed in the common law jurisdictions make it even harder to talk about a 
common law of torts (since they are remarkably different by now) and which 
of them is more appropriate from an economic perspective.  The creative 
developments in New Zealand make this jurisdiction a clear outlier at the 
moment.  Yet, from an economic perspective, there are significant 
advantages (legal certainty, reduction of litigation costs) and important 
disadvantages (inappropriate compensation, ossification of the law).  It is 
unclear if the New Zealand reform is efficient inasmuch as the common law 
principles of tort law could be inefficient.  In the following two subsections, 
we look at further examples in detail. 
B.  Defamation Law 
Defamation is a tort concerned with the publication of false defamatory 
statements about another person that tend to injure a person’s reputation by 
degrading them in the opinion of their neighbors or to make them 
ridiculous.121  Defamation can be divided into libel, in which publication is in 
a permanent form, and slander, which is oral publication.122  To find an 
action for publication, the offending matter must be published with a third 
party.123 
                                                                                                                                                       
 117 Australia tried to enact a similar system.  The proposal was, anyway, more comprehensive 
than the New Zealand system, since Australians aimed to cover the whole population from any 
personal injury.  The proposal never reached the necessary parliamentary majority.  For more 
references on the New Zealand reform and the Australian proposals, see JOHN G. FLEMING, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 374–78 (8th ed. 1992). 
 118 Id. 
 119 COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 107; TORT 
AND INSURANCE LAW, supra note 107. 
 120 See Barzel, supra note 47, at 255 (noting that tort law, as a means to delineate rights, 
tends towards inefficiency but never maintains a constant level of efficiency). 
 121 HENRY COLEMAN FOLKARD, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LIBEL 1 (7th ed. 1908). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
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The common law provides for the establishment of a defamation claim in 
tort and the applicable defenses.124  However, judge-made law has 
significantly changed defamation law in common law jurisdictions.  In the 
United States, libel law came under the influence of federal constitutional 
law after 1964.  In that year, in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan,125 the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that state laws making newspapers 
strictly liable for false defamatory statements were generally inconsistent 
with First Amendment rights of freedom of press.126  The reasoning was as 
follows: If public officials are allowed to recover damages for any false and 
defamatory statement, regardless of the level of care taken, then newspapers 
will be discouraged, or chilled, from printing stories on matters of public 
interest.  To moderate this chilling effect, the Supreme Court imposed a 
standard of proof in libel cases involving public official plaintiffs which was 
much higher than that used in most state courts at the time.127 
The United Kingdom followed a different approach.  The Defamation Act 
1952 restated and clarified the common law principles of defamation.128  A 
strict liability rule operates and damages are usually compensatory.  In the 
particular case of libel, no damage to the plaintiff has to be proved.  In 
slander, special damage must be proved except where the statement is an 
imputation of a criminal offense.129  With the exception of the special 
damage, the Defamation Act of 1952 was repealed and replaced by the 
Defamation Act 1996 and the relevant parts of the Electronic Commerce 
Regulations 2002.130  The new law was partially developed under the 
influence of previous controversial case law and intended to limit claims of a 
tort of defamation.131  
Other common law jurisdictions have restated the common law principles 
of the tort of defamation in their legislation, such as the New Zealand 
Defamation Act 1992, the Irish Defamation Act 1961 and Defamation Act 
2009, or the Australian model Defamation Act 2006.132  These statutes were 
                                                                                                                                                       
 124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WITNESSES IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 558 (2011).  
 125 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 126 Id. at 279. 
 127 Id. at 283. 
 128 Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz 2, c. 66, § 6 (Eng.), available at http:// 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6and1Eliz2/15-16/66. 
 129 Milner Frankum et al., United Kingdom, in 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT 
LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ch. 36 (2010) [hereinafter 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW].  
 130 Id.  
 131 Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/19 
96/31/data.pdf; Electronic Commerce Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/2555 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2013/pdfs/uksi_20022013_en.pdf.  
 132 Defamation Act 1992 (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1992/ 
0105/latest/DLM280687.html; Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) (Ir.), available at http:// 
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deeply influenced by controversial case law such as Oceanic Sun Line 
Special Shipping Co. v. Fay or Gutnick v. Down Jones & Co. in Australia.133  
In Canada, defamation law is regulated by provincial statutes that have been 
shaped by legal doctrines developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
salient cases such as Hill v. Church of Scientology.134 
The significant difference between the United States and the remaining 
common law jurisdictions is the more generous treatment of defendants in 
the United States.135  Libel law deals with a clash of two important values: 
freedom of speech and freedom from defamation.  The proper balance 
between these goals has been debated in economics.  It is unclear if the 
American model is closer to efficiency than the traditional common law 
approach.136  Significant differences between the political system, the media 
industry, or the prevalence of corruption could suggest that the different 
approaches can be equally efficient depending on local needs. 
C.  Professional Responsibility 
Under the traditional principles of the common law, lawyers acting as 
advocates have professional immunity and could not be sued for professional 
responsibility.  The immunity for misconduct tort litigation was established 
in the eighteenth century.  Although the scope and justification for the 
immunity have evolved in case law due to public policy considerations, it 
                                                                                                                                                       
www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.0031.pdf; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s. 25 
(Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/num_act/da20068o2006145/.  
 133 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co. v Fay [1988] 165 CLR 197 (Austl.); Down Jones 
& Co. v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (Austl.). 
 134 Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.). 
 135 Frankum et al., supra note 129; William L. Northcote & Christopher M. Schiffmann, 
Canada, in 1 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ch. 6 
(2010) [hereinafter 1 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW]; Paul Kirton, Australia, 
in 1 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW, supra, ch. 6; Andrew Fawcett et al., New 
Zealand, in 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW, supra note 129, ch. 27 (2010); 
Jonathan Kelly et al., Ireland, in 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW, supra note 
129, ch. 17. 
 136 See Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of Political Dishonesty and Defamation, 19 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 167 (1999) (arguing that tabloids are better informed than society and can 
provide an auditing role in preventing political corruption so long as they are deterred from 
defamation); Nuno Garoupa, Dishonesty and Libel Law: The Economics of the “Chilling” 
Effect, 155 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 284 (1999) (arguing that the plaintiff 
winning a defamation suit is not a problem if the media can distinguish between honesty and 
dishonesty); OREN BAR-GILL & ASSAF HAMDANI, OPTIMAL LIABILITY FOR LIBEL 6 (2003) 
(demonstrating an alternative model of libel); Manoj Dalvi & James F. Refalo, An Economic 
Analysis of Libel Law, 34 E. ECON. J. 74 (2008) (describing another model of liberal law); Ido 
Baum et al., Reporter’s Privilege and Incentives to Leak, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 701 (2009) 
(demonstrating that reporters have demonstrable incentives to report leaks, as defamation 
lawsuits rarely succeed). 
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was largely confirmed by the House of Lords in Rondel v. Worsley137 and in 
Saif Ali v. Sydney Smith Mitchell & Co.138  However, more recently, in 
Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, the House of Lords has significantly 
eroded the immunity to the point of effective abolishment by reinforcing the 
professional duty to the court.139  Unlike the House of Lords, the Australian 
High Court has confirmed the professional immunity for lawyers, as seen in 
the important case of D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid.140  The 
professional immunity was never recognized in Canada or in the United 
States.  The main reasoning seems to be that there was no formal distinction 
between barrister and solicitor in these jurisdictions. 
Although there are important differences in the structure of the legal 
profession in common law jurisdictions, they do not seem to be a persuasive 
argument to justify the different approaches from an efficiency perspective.  
It seems unlikely, from an economic perspective, that a no liability rule can 
be efficient.  Therefore, not only does the traditional principle of immunity in 
common law seem unlikely to be efficient, but this also presents a case of 
inefficient persistence.  
D.  Cost Rules in Civil Litigation 
The allocation of costs is critically important for civil litigation.  In the 
United Kingdom, the so-called English rule largely prevails.141  The general 
rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the 
successful party.  However, the award of costs at the conclusion of a case is 
at the discretion of the court.  The discretion extends to whether the costs are 
payable by one party to another, the amount of those costs, and when they 
are to be paid.  In deciding what order they need to make about costs, the 
court must give regard to all the circumstances including the conduct of the 
parties.142 
In Canada, a rule of shifting of costs in litigation by which the loser in a 
civil lawsuit must compensate the winner for a portion of the latter’s legal 
costs is also applied.143  Generally speaking, costs do not amount to full 
compensation, and the proportion of the winner’s legal bill covered by an 
                                                                                                                                                       
 137 [1960] 1 A.C. 191 (H.L.). 
 138 [1980] A.C. 198 (H.L.). 
 139 Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v Simons, [2002] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 615. 
 140 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid, [2005] 223 HCA 12 (Austl.). 
 141 See also discussion by Paul Hopkins, The Success of Mediation in the UK, in ADR 
CLIENT STRATEGIES IN THE UK: LEADING LAWYERS ON PREPARING CLIENTS, NAVIGATING THE 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS, AND OVERCOMING OBSTACLES 145 (2008). 
 142 Civil Procedure Rules and Directions, pt. 44 (U.K.), available at http://www.justice.gov. 
uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/pdf/parts/part44.pdf.  
 143 Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 57 (Can.). 
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award of costs typically decreases over time as legal fees continue to rise.  
Yet, since the nature of the rule remains informal and discretionary, litigants 
cannot fully rely upon its application when deciding whether or not to 
litigate.  The decision to award costs is made at the conclusion of the action, 
which means a plaintiff still risks a substantial loss if the claim is ultimately 
unsuccessful.  
“Both Australia and New Zealand follow the English civil rule . . . unless 
the successful party has in some way behaved improperly in the course of the 
litigation.”144  The same applies in Ireland where, as a general rule, the loser 
pays the costs.145  The right to an order in these circumstances is not 
absolute, however, and the court can exercise its discretion based upon the 
facts of the particular case.146 
In contrast, in the United States each side generally bears its own costs, 
the so-called American rule.147  Notice that the English rule prevailed in the 
U.S. until the nineteenth century.148  The American rule was developed as 
lawyers gained the power to negotiate their contracts in a fairly unregulated 
framework.  It became dominant by the 1850s.149  However, variants of a 
loser-pays-all rule still exist in federal civil procedure, namely Rule 68 of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by which a party might have to reimburse 
the costs of the other party if the award is less than a rejected offer of 
settlement (a similar rule has been adopted in England and Wales after the 
Woolf reforms to civil procedure in 1996).150  In many cases, the court is 
allowed to order the losing side to pay the legal costs of the winner; however, 
this is often subject to the discretion of the judge.151 
There is an extensive literature on the American versus English rule in 
civil litigation.  There is no consensus in the theoretical literature concerning 
the overall effect of shifting litigation costs.152  The controversial topics 
include the extent to which shifting costs promote settlement,153 enhance 
                                                                                                                                                       
 144 Ian Freckelton, Judicial Attitudes Toward Scientific Evidence: The Antipodean 
Experience, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1142 (1997). 
 145 MELODY BUCKLEY, CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE (2004). 
 146 Id. 
 147 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 1050. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1996), available at http://webarchive.nationalarch 
ives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm. 
 151 For some versions of fee-shifting in specific circumstances, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4), 
26(g)(3), 37, 41(d)(1). 
 152 Hugh Gravelle, The Efficiency Implications of Cost-Shifting Rules, 13 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 3, 3 (1993); see also Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative 
Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 181–82 (1984) (explaining that the 
glut of assumptions required by fee-shifting analysis make reaching clear conclusions 
difficult).  
 153 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 
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civil litigation,154 favor more meritorious claims or decrease the number of 
nuisance lawsuits.155  The results depend on asymmetric information,156 risk 
aversion,157 strategic positions158 and other procedural rules.159  The 
empirical and experimental literature does not seem to be conclusive.160 
It is clear that the English rule tends to prevail in common law 
jurisdictions.161  The United States deviated from the general trend in the 
nineteenth century.162  The evolution of the rules concerning cost allocation 
could be a good example of multiple equilibria where the final outcome is 
determined by local determinants.  The different structure of the legal 
markets, the practice of contingency fees (largely confined to the United 
States until recently),163 and the needs posed by different rates of growing 
civil litigation could easily determine the appropriate use of different rules.164 
                                                                                                                                                       
RAND J. ECON. 404, 404 (1984).  
 154 Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative 
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 72 (1982) (explaining that 
British and American rules may interact with other factors to influence “social welfare relative 
to the goal of achieving an appropriate volume of litigation”).  
 155 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the 
Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 371, 372 (1996).  
 156 Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric-Information Model of Litigation, 22 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 153 (2002).  
 157 Shavell, supra note 154, at 57–58.  
 158 Hylton, supra note 156, at 154.  
 159 Brian G.M. Main & Andrew Park, The Impact of Defendant Offers into Court on 
Negotiation in the Shadow of the Law: Experimental Evidence, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 177, 
178 (2002) (noting the existence of procedural arrangements specifically designed to influence 
settlement that can influence the choice of cost-shifting rule); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis 
L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 
557 (1986); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I’ll Be Suing You, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989); Louis Kaplow, Shifting Plaintiffs’ Fees Versus Increasing Damage 
Awards, 24 RAND J. ECON. 625 (1993); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Optimal 
Awards and Penalties When the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs, 27 RAND 
J. ECON. 269 (1996); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule 
Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 519 (1998). 
 160 Compare Edward A. Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal 
Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345, 377–78 (concluding that the 
English rule reduces overall litigation and encourages settlement), and Main & Park, supra 
note 159, at 188 (concluding that the English rule has little impact on “propensity to settle”), 
with Brian G.M. Main & Andrew Park, An Experiment with Two-Way Offers into Court: 
Restoring the Balance in Pre-Trial Negotiation, 30 J. ECON. STUD. 125, 139–40 (2003) 
(concluding that English rule may reduce settlement but ultimately has highly variable 
effects). 
 161 Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the 
Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1946 (2002).  
 162 LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 30, at 105. 
 163 Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Nonconveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. 
REV. 309, 346 (2002).  
 164 The consideration of variants does not change the conclusions of our analysis.  For 
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E.  Civil Juries 
Whereas the United States continues to use of civil juries, their use has 
drastically declined over the past decades in the U.K.,165 Australia,166 New 
Zealand,167 Canada,168 and Ireland.169  “Until the mid-nineteenth century, jury 
trial was the only form of trial in the common law courts, and until the early 
twentieth century, it continued to predominate for civil as well as criminal 
cases.”170  The civil jury has largely disappeared in England and Wales, and 
the right to a jury in criminal cases has been significantly reduced as well.171  
In the U.K. “[t]oday, less than one percent of civil trials are jury trials”; such 
trials are limited to cases of libel and slander, fraud, malicious prosecution, 
and false imprisonment as defined by the Supreme Court Act.172  However, 
even in these limited cases, the trial judge has the discretion to deny the right 
to a jury if the case is particularly complex.173  In Ward v. James, the Court 
of Appeal held that a single judge should hear all personal injury litigation 
unless there were special considerations.174  
In England and Wales, civil juries are most frequently used in defamation 
cases.  The frequent large awards decided by juries have been a matter of 
controversy.  In 1995, the Court of Appeal in John v. MGN Ltd. ruled to curb 
                                                                                                                                                       
examples of such variants, consider Janice Toran, Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney Fees: 
Comparing English Payment into Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 301, 304, 
308 (1985–1986), citing U.S. Federal Rule 68 and the English practice of payment into court 
as rules that shift costs based on the failure to achieve settlement; or Bebchuk & Chang, supra 
note 155, at 372, citing Federal Rule 11 as a rule shifting costs based on the margin of victory.  
Also, the fact that American states have variants of the English rule under some conditions; 
see for example Main & Park, supra note 159, at 178 & n.3, which does not undermine our 
conclusion. 
 165 Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries and 
Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (1999).  
 166 Michael Chesterman, Criminal Trial Juries in Australia: From Penal Colonies to a 
Federal Democracy, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 69 n.1 (1999).  
 167 Neil Cameron et al., The New Zealand Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 138 
(1999).  
 168 W.A. Bogart, “Guardian of Civil Rights . . . Medieval Relic”: The Civil Jury in Canada, 
62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305 (1999).  
 169 John D. Jackson et al., The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow of a 
Troubled Past, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1999).  
 170 Bostock & Thomas, supra note 165, at 9.   
 171 Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Common Law Jury, in 
WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 7 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000); Oscar G. Chase, American 
“Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 288–89 (2002).  
 172 Bostock & Thomas, supra note 165, at 13; Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of 
the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 202 (1990) (“In England, a series of 
restrictions reduced the use of juries from 100 percent of civil trials in 1854 to two percent a 
century later.”). 
 173 Bostock & Thomas, supra note 165, at 13. 
 174 Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q.B. 273 (Eng.). 
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excessive jury awards by altering jury instructions.175  The Defamation Act 
of 1996 further curtailed the role of juries in libel cases, establishing a 
summary procedure whereby judges, not juries, can dispose of libel claims 
up to £10,000.176  The Court of Appeal has also issued guidelines on the 
directions given to juries assessing damages in cases of wrongful arrest and 
malicious prosecution brought against the police.177  Case law, reinforced by 
specific statute law, has essentially eliminated civil juries in the U.K.178 
In Australia, civil juries are still available in all of the states except South 
Australia, but are rarely used outside New South Wales and Victoria.179  
Furthermore, trial by jury in Australian civil matters has substantially 
declined in the last decades.180  Today, Australian judges decide the large 
majority of civil cases.181  It is rare, particularly following recent legislative 
reforms to tort law, for a jury to decide a civil case.182  In Australian 
jurisdictions without legislative mandates abolishing juries in civil actions, 
legislation “tends to allow the parties to opt for trial by jury . . . but maintains 
the court’s discretion to control that choice.”183  “[T]he courts have discretion 
to order jury trials for certain types of lawsuits, such as defamation, fraud, 
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and motor vehicle accidents.”184  
                                                                                                                                                       
 175 [1997] Q.B. 586 (Eng.). 
 176 Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31, §§ 8–9.  
 177 Thompson v. Comm’r of Police of the Metropolis, [1997] 2 All E.R. 762 (Eng.). 
 178 Lewis N. Klar, The Impact of the U.S. Tort Law in Canada, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 359, 366 
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Tort Litigation in Australia, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 139 (2007). 
 181 See, e.g., Tilbury & Luntz, supra note 179, at 776 (stating “the majority of civil actions 
[in Australia] do not use juries”); Kylie Burns, The Role of the Judiciary: Passive or Active?, 
LEGALDATE, May 2006, at 4 (“Judges now decide the vast majority of court cases in 
Australia.”); Jacqueline Horan, Perceptions of the Civil Jury System, 31 MONASH U. L. REV. 
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 182 Burns, supra note 181.  
 183 Tilbury & Luntz, supra note 179, at 775–76; see also Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd. 
(2002) 2009 CLR 478, 507 (Austl.) (disputing that civil jury trials cost more and take longer).  
 184 Lucille M. Ponte, Reassessing the Australian Adversarial System: An Overview of Issues 
in Court Reform and Federal ADR Practice in the Land Down Under, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L 
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However, courts will rarely order a jury trial in strictly commercial 
disputes.185  Australian jury trials are “almost always reserved for more 
serious criminal matters.”186  The profound difference in the way the U.S. 
and Australia treat civil juries has been recognized by the literature.187 
Civil juries are also rarely used in New Zealand.188  The Supreme Court 
Act of 1841 established a right to jury trial in all civil cases.189  In 1860, the 
Supreme Court ruled that parties could consent to having judges alone 
determine issues of fact.190  From 1862 to 1977, “minor jury sittings” (began 
with six jurors but shifted to four jurors prior to abolishment) were 
established for cases under £100 in value and were used at the discretion of 
the trial judge.191  Currently, the High Court provides the right to civil jury 
trial in most cases at the request of either party.192  Nevertheless, civil jury 
trials are so rare in practice that the Department for Courts no longer even 
keeps statistics on it.  When implemented, civil juries are largely confined to 
defamation and personal injury cases, and are sometimes used in actions 
against governmental bodies.193  However, “New Zealand effectively 
abolished juries in personal injury cases in 1972 by adopting a no-fault 
compensation system that replaced litigation.”194  In New Zealand, we could 
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say that there is still a theoretical right to a jury trial in civil cases, but such 
right is rarely used in practice.195   
As with other common law jurisdictions, civil juries exist on the 
periphery in Canada.196  In some Canadian jurisdictions the use of civil juries 
has been highly curtailed while in other jurisdictions it has been outright 
abolished.197  Canadian courts retain the right to interfere with the judgment 
of a jury once it has reached a verdict;198 however, judges usually show great 
deference to the jury’s verdict.199  Juries are most often used in motor vehicle 
accident litigation and are frequently sought by institutional parties.200  They 
are most prevalent in Ontario.201  Courts most often strike civil juries if the 
factual issues of a case are unduly complex.202  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court held in 1997 that judges have the discretion to determine whether to 
strike a civil jury if jurors can reasonably infer that a defendant was insured 
against a finding of liability.203  
Civil jury trials have almost entirely disappeared in Ireland.204  In the 
Republic of Ireland, civil juries are retained only for libel, slander, assault, 
and false imprisonment cases; in Northern Ireland, civil juries are retained 
only for libel claims or if the judge accedes to a particular application.205  
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It is clear that the U.S. has not followed the path of other common law 
jurisdictions in eliminating or drastically reducing the use of civil juries.206  
In fact, legal scholars have suggested the advantages of following the 
Australian or the English models in the United States.207  The economic 
literature has considered the multiple implications of using civil juries, 
including legal certainty, the impact on awards, the development of 
procedural rules, and the potential additional litigation costs.208  Both at the 
theoretical and at the empirical level, it is unclear if the use of civil juries is 
economically efficient.209 
More fundamentally, it is difficult to see how civil juries should be 
efficient in the United States but not in the other common law jurisdictions 
nowadays.  It is clear that all common law jurisdictions initially had civil 
juries, and most have abandoned such institution because of legal costs and 
uncertainty.  However, given the role of civil juries in the United States, it is 
unclear how the efficiency hypothesis could explain the different paths taken.  
It could be the case that the U.S. is behind the other jurisdictions in the 
evolutionary process, and so it is just a matter of time that civil juries are 
abolished in the United States.  Such would be the most reasonable 
prediction under the efficiency hypothesis of the common law. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has discussed the efficiency hypothesis of the common law 
from the perspective of comparative law.  We argue that the general 
treatment of this hypothesis by legal economists leaves unanswered many 
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questions regarding the significant variations across the common law 
jurisdictions. 
By making use of the mathematical models developed by legal 
economists to explain the efficiency hypothesis of the common law, we 
analyzed two different problems.  First, there is not a single efficient rule or 
doctrine, but a multiplicity of possible equilibria depending on selective 
litigation.  Second, for each specific set of selective litigation, there is no 
guarantee that there will be convergence to efficiency, depending on judicial 
attributes and the preponderance of precedent. 
The identification of the efficiency of the common law is much more 
intricate and multifaceted than anticipated by the literature.  A mere 
comparison of how a specific predicament is addressed in each jurisdiction, 
as inspired by the legal origins literature, is not only insufficient, but likely to 
produce gross mistakes.  The observation that each jurisdiction provides a 
different legal outcome says very little about efficiency.  First, there are 
multiple efficient legal solutions.  Second, the variables that determine 
efficient outcomes vary significantly across the common law jurisdictions 
(England and Wales, U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland).  A 
proper analysis requires a clear understanding of local determinants, 
including judicial preferences, before we can jump to the conclusion that the 
common law is undoubtedly efficient (or more precisely, which common law 
is undoubtedly efficient). 
Our thesis has been illustrated with a detailed discussion of some relevant 
examples: tort law, defamation law, professional responsibility, allocation of 
costs in civil litigation, and civil juries.  These examples are not exhaustive 
or suggested to be representative; they are merely good starting points for an 
important academic discussion.  They show that once we depart from 
generalities into specific doctrines and rules, the analysis is complex, dense 
and less clear than the legal origins literature tends to portray. 
